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ABSTRACT

KEYWORDS

A multi-theory framework is offered for guiding managerial decision making in complex professional human service organizations; a growing segment of the economy for which the ability to
proactively and dynamically manage knowledge assets is naturally critical to performance.
Following a call for greater theoretical integration, this framework synthesizes essential and
complimentary elements of three theoretical domains. It combines Transaction Economics’
focus on the appropriate procurement of knowledge assets, with Knowledge Management’s
focus on how to dynamically unleash the potential of those assets, and Contingency Thinking’s
focus on how to structurally harness and direct that potential. Two key “bridging constructs”
emerge offering useful insights both for theory and practice: 1) learning systems as a key element
of functional design for managing knowledge assets, and 2) learning costs as a key factor in
managing the economic structure of knowledge assets. We apply our integrated framework to
two professional human services sectors – business education and health service delivery– and
discuss broader implications for research and practice.

Organization capability;
managing knowledge assets;
professional service firms;
theory integration;
functional and economic
structure

Complex professional human service organizations (e.g.,
hospitals, universities, and law, accounting, information,
consultancy, and financial service firms) comprise a large
and growing segment of postindustrial economies (Florida,
2014). Such firms increasingly characterize the new reality
of competition in modern business environments that are
more uncertain, fluid, and centered around knowledge.
Because these types of firms are extremely dependent for
success on the knowledge possessed by highly educated
professionalized workers (Von Nordenflycht, 2010), their
ability to proactively and dynamically manage knowledge
assets is naturally critical to their performance.
Although there are many “classic” theories available to
guide managers of such organizations, they provide a
shrinking source of strategic advantage when considered
in isolation, due to the fact that they have become so
widely dispersed and, more importantly, are limited in
scope from capturing the evolving interdependencies
between their respective areas of focus. It is therefore
necessary to look for important guiding insights in the
combinatory space between theoretical domains, which, if
used astutely, comprise wellsprings of opportunities for
better understanding and managing knowledge assets.
Our purpose in this article is to develop an enhanced
framework for guiding managerial decision making in
complex professional human service (cPHS)
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organizations that identifies useful “bridges” between
three potentially synergistic theoretical domains: contingency thinking, knowledge management, and transaction economics. We have chosen to focus on these
three theory streams particularly for their practical
relevance to strengthening the capabilities and effectiveness of modern cPHS firms. For these theoretical
streams, traditionally regarded as alternative frameworks, and thus typically considered independently,
we show that their complementary strengths offer
potential for integration and synthesis; generating
important bridging themes and constructs at their
interfaces.
Specifically, in the following sections we (a) provide
rationale for a synergistic framework, (b) detail the
framework’s constituent theoretical components, (c)
present the framework’s key bridging themes and constructs, (d) illustrate the entire framework in action by
applying it in two types of cPHS contexts (business
schools and hospitals), and (e) discuss its implications.

Rationale for synergistic framework
As the field of strategic management has evolved, theories of organizational capability (e.g., Barney, 1991;
Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, 2007, 2014; Teece,
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Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) have slowly replaced theories of
market positioning (e.g., Porter, 1990, 1996) for explaining successful business strategies (Zenger, 2013). Many
authors emphasize that developing and evolving distinctive resource configurations (also referred to as “core
competencies”; e.g., Prahalad & Hamel, 1980) and selecting the appropriate form of corporate governance are
today more important to competitive success than necessarily protecting products against imitation or raising
barriers to the mobility of rivals (e.g., Argyres &
Zenger, 2012). Empirical evidence suggests that strategies focused on systemic firm-specific resources and
knowledge-based sources of value creation tend to be
more effective for sustaining competitive advantage than
strategies focused on industry competitiveness, particularly in highly dynamic sectors where market power is
insufficient to sustain superior performance (Hawawini,
Subramanian, & Verdin, 2003).
Consistent with this reasoning, strategists are calling
for refinements to our understanding of organization
capability that include not only useful extensions to
existing theory but also the integration of independent
theoretical streams (Mahoney & McGahan, 2007).
Some management scholars (e.g., Kessler & Bartunek,
2014) have similarly suggested the value of creating
integrative “maps”—constructed by “stitching together”
multiple theories from different domains—to present a
more holistic picture of their interrelated systems and
complementary content. Although established theories
work well within their specified boundary conditions, a
more synergistic approach to theorizing arranges these
boundaries in a manner that bridges their complementary slices of reality (e.g., Tsoukas, 1994). For example,
Campbell’s (1969) article presenting a “fish scale model
of omniscience” contends that enhanced understanding
is best pursued via meta-theoretical systems that
synthesize narrow and overlapping domains of specialized thought. Further, Baum and Rowley (2002)
demonstrate the utility of delineating and piecing
together the “interconnections and substantial overlaps” among existing theories for expanding their
explanatory as well as predictive power. Moreover,
according to Kessler and Bartunek (2014), these integrative theoretical “maps,” in addition to offering a
more complete and accurate picture of reality, also
offer improved pragmatic guidance to practicing managers. The integration of theory is thus valuable not
only for explaining the interlocking interdependencies
of organizational systems but also for developing more
multilevel policies and recommendations that take into
account the cumulative effects of their variables across
theoretical domains. As such, the integration of existing
frameworks is useful for managers to construct more

holistic solution sets that better address complex realworld problems.
We therefore conclude that a more integrative framework is needed for describing and developing the strategic capabilities of modern organizations that are
derived from superior management of knowledge assets.
In this article we focus on one such type of organization
—the aforementioned complex professional human service (cPHS) firms. These are particularly emblematic of
the evolving economy by virtue of their high ratio of
labor to capital and dependency on the sizeable stock of
esoteric knowledge and specialized expertise embodied
in highly educated professionalized workers (Morris &
Empson, 1998; Starbuck, 1992; Von Nordenflycht, 2010).
Toward this end, we propose that progress toward
greater conceptual synthesis is tendered through the confluence of three traditionally distinct streams of thinking:
Contingency Thinking, Knowledge Management Theory,
and Transaction Cost Economics. We chose to focus on
these theoretical domains because of what we see as their
dominant influence on management thought and action,
their complementary strengths and shortcomings, and
their potential for integration and synthesis, generating
important domain-spanning constructs where they
overlap.
One branch of contingency thinking, which we call
Technology-Based Contingency Theory (TBCT),
focuses on the activities to solve problems or conduct
core tasks (see, e.g., Galbraith, 1973; Perrow, 1970;
Thompson, 1967; Woodward, 1965). The “if/then” nature of this stream is very helpful in prescribing alignments between core task information-processing
demands and functional structure, but is largely inattentive to knowledge processes and transactions.
Knowledge Management Theory (KMT) focuses on
the dynamics and management of organizational
knowledge and learning (Argyris, 1999; Nonaka, 1994;
Senge, 1990), which have been identified as critical for
capability formation and performance differentiation in
the modern organization (Grant, 1996; Kogut &
Zander, 1992; Von Nordenflycht, 2010; Winter, 1987).
However, KMT tends to be vague about the best functional and economic arrangements for managing
knowledge assets. Fusing TBCT and KMT can point
to methods and tools for applying knowledge to solve
core problems. However, neither stream accounts adequately for knowledge providers as potentially selfinterested beings and the economic arrangements by
which they transact with the organization. Transaction
Cost Economics (TCE) focuses on economizing the
asset exchanges (transactions) underlying a firm’s activities (see, e.g., Williamson, 1975, 1985). TCE is prescriptively informative about the ideal relationship
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between economic structure and asset exchange risks
and costs, but is inattentive to functional structure and,
particularly, the learning costs to capitalize on the
unique qualities of knowledge assets. Thus, although
each draws attention to certain theoretical dynamics
important to consider when conducting research on
or making decisions for complex professional human
service organizations, each also creates risks that other
potentially critical factors may be overlooked or poorly
considered.
Foss and Foss (1998b) noted that there has been
relatively little dialogue and synergy between organizational economists and knowledge-based theorists.
However, to some degree, the need for greater integration has been recognized within the theoretical
domains focused on here. Grant (1996) applied structural contingency prescriptions to knowledge management, and Birkinshaw, Nobel, and Ridderstrale (2002)
used knowledge attributes to predict structural contingencies. Jiang (2011) asserted that transaction cost economics must be joined with a theory of knowledge and
production, and even Williamson (1999) acknowledged
the complementarity of the competence “[knowledge]
perspective” and the governance [economic]
perspective.”
Our framework synthesizes essential and complimentary elements of these three conceptual streams.
This integrative framework focuses at the level of
core task activities for subunits of cPHS organizations, and the knowledge dynamics and asset
exchange factors associated with those tasks. It combines TCE’s focus on the appropriate procurement
of knowledge assets, with KMT’s focus on how to
dynamically unleash the potential of those assets,
and TBCT’s focus on how to structurally harness
and direct that potential. In doing so, it surfaces
two key bridging constructs for greater managerial
attention: (a) learning systems (integrating TBCT
and KMT) as a key element of functional design
for managing knowledge assets, including the associated cultural elements to support it, and (b) learning costs (integrating KMT and TCE) as a key factor
in managing the economic structure of knowledge
assets.
In the section that follows, we analyze in greater
detail the key strengths and shortcomings of the
constituent
theories:
Technology-Based
Contingency Theory (primarily as related to “core
task technologies”), Knowledge Management
Theory, and Transaction Cost Economics, with particular attention to the constructs that emerge at
their intersections.
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Constituent theoretical domains
Technology-Based Contingency Theory (TBCT)
The overarching contribution of general contingency
thinking is that there is no single best organization
form for optimal performance; rather, it depends on
many factors such as its environment, strategy, size,
and technology (Burns & Stalker, 1961; Galbraith,
1973; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967).
In this article, we focus on the link between core
task technology and operating structure because it is
there that important “micro-foundations” of organizational capabilities are most effectuated (Felin & Foss,
2005; Felin, Foss, Heimeriks, & Madsen, 2012; Felin,
Foss, & Ployhart, 2015; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015): what
we refer to as Technology-Based Contingency Theory
(TBCT).
TBCT focuses on the activities of “core tasks” (i.e.,
those vital to strategic capabilities) at the subunit level
of organizations, with the objective of understanding
and prescribing the optimal alignment between “core
task technology” and organizational operating (or functional) structure, including grouping schemes, optimal
span of control (number of managerial reports), and
degrees of centralization of authority and formalization
of rules (Woodward, 1965). “Technology” is viewed
very broadly by this school to include any tangible
and intangible means to transform inputs into outputs,
including information, knowledge, methods, and tools.
Perrow (1967) recognized that organizations can deploy
multiple task technologies that vary at the subunit level.
The dominant logic of TBCT is that core task “technology” determines functional structure. The role of the manager is to choose, according to the demands of their task
technology, the appropriate functional design features for
organizational units. The key element determining structure is the information-processing demands of the core task
that derive from the amount of uncertainty caused by task
complexity and dynamism.
“Task variability” and “problem analyzability” are
central task characteristics determining organization
structure (Perrow, 1967). Task variability refers to the
frequency of unexpected and novel events that occur in
the transformation process, making it difficult to predict facts in advance when variety is high. Problem
analyzability concerns the potential for individuals to
solve problems using objective, routinized procedures
(e.g., sequencing actions through procedural processes).
Low problem analyzability (e.g., need for ad hoc
sequencing of actions) places greater reliance on judgment and experience, rather than on formal rules and
routines (as in cPHS organizations).
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The increased uncertainty arising from high variability and low analyzability of core tasks forces a subunit to increase its information-processing capacity
through structural mechanisms for collecting appropriate information, applying information in a timely fashion, transmitting information without distortion, and
handling high volumes of information (Daft & Lengel,
1986). TBCT research establishes that flatter, flexible,
decentralized “organic” structures are better than hierarchical, centralized, formalized “mechanistic” forms
for providing the autonomy and discretion to deal
with greater uncertainty (Burns & Stalker, 1961;
Keller, 1994; Larkey & Sproull, 1984; Lawrence &
Lorsch, 1967; Tushman & Nadler, 1978).
Uncertainty also arises when critical interrelated
elements of core task activities must be coordinated
within and across organizational subunits (Galbraith,
1973; Thompson, 1967; Van De Ven & Drazin, 1985).
When various functional departments are highly interdependent for the accomplishment of an objective,
such as in the case of educational programs and
healthcare delivery, uncertainty increases due to the
requirements for frequent and accurate cross-unit
communication. Frequent reciprocal adjustments
between departments increase the need for more
information processing and, therefore, for more specific horizontal coordination mechanisms, such as liaisons and teams. This is witnessed, for example, in
increased adoption of “lean management” principles
encouraging cross-functional teamwork and communications to facilitate hand-offs among health care
staff and transitions of care across service settings
(Graban, 2016).
Notwithstanding the important contributions of
TBCT, it appears inadequate for designing effective
organizations when there is a need to conduct highly
complex, knowledge-intensive activities. Clear distinctions between technology, information, and knowledge are necessary for a more sophisticated
contingency theory of organization applied to knowledge-dependent industries. Although Perrow (1967,
1970) originally identified knowledge as an important
aspect of core task technology, TBCT has more commonly focused on information and on physical tools
for information processing and production (with few
exceptions; e.g., Birkinshaw et al., 2002). Yet solving
problems requires appropriate knowledge about the
task environment and its dynamics, and about how
information tools may be applied to change it.
Further, since much of the critical knowledge needed
to tackle mission-centric core problems in cPHS firms
resides in people, we need to question TBCT’s proclivity to view knowledge providers as benevolent,

thus ignoring exchange risks associated with opportunistic human behavior.
In summary, TBCT posits that the key to superior
organization performance lies in creating the optimal
fit between the information processing requirements of
a subunit’s core task activities and its choices about
operating structure. Prescriptively, the high degree of
task complexity, dynamism, and interdependence that
characterizes cPHS organizations serves to increase
uncertainty and information-processing demands, dictating more organic organization designs grouped
around reciprocally interdependent activities. This is
observed, for example, in grouping health care providers by clinical specialty, business consultants by industry and practice expertise (e.g., strategy, information
systems, human resource management), or attorneys
by legal domain (e.g., corporate, litigation, tax).
However, TBCT is largely inattentive to the processes
and economics of knowledge assets that are so central to
cPHS organizations. The next sections address these
apparent TBCT shortcomings.
Knowledge Management Theory (KMT)
KMT can itself be viewed as an amalgam of conceptual
streams concerning the nature and role of knowledge in
organizations, sharing the premise that superior knowledge management is the key to superior organizational
capability and performance. One stream, the
“Knowledge Based View (KBV) of the firm” (e.g.,
Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Spender, 1996;
Winter, 2003)—which originates from and extends the
Resource Based View (e.g., Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959;
Wernerfelt, 1984)—establishes knowledge as a firm’s
most strategically significant resource. KBV identifies
variations in the knowledge bases and capabilities
among firms as the major determinants of sustained
competitive advantage and superior performance.
According to KBV, knowledge plays a crucial role in
enabling the firm to transform inputs into valuable
outputs by determining how other resources are
applied along the transformation process (Arrow,
1971; Nelson & Winter, 1982). The ability of a firm to
generate unique value to the end consumer depends on
distinctive knowledge (Szulanski, 1996, 2000) that is
socially complex, accumulated over time through context-specific learning and practice, and thus difficult to
imitate or transfer (Dierichx & Cool, 1989; Nonaka &
Takeuchi, 1995). Since the process of accumulating
knowledge is to a great degree holistic, ill-defined,
contextually specific, and grounded in unique historical
pathways (Barney, 1991), firms differ from each other
in the degree they possess such firm-specific, uniquely
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evolved knowledge. Many KMT authors have discussed
how an organization may create superior value through
higher-order “meta-routines” (likened to its “genetic
material”; Nelson & Winter, 1982) for integrating specialized knowledge or dynamically recombining existing resources based on the internal, multilevel networks
between individuals and groups (Grant, 1996; Kogut &
Zander, 1992; Spender, 1996; Teece, 2014; Zollo &
Winter, 2002). From this perspective, the firm exists to
facilitate the generation, accumulation, transfer, and
integration of knowledge.
Toward the purpose of unleashing and leveraging
critical knowledge assets, another KMT stream illuminates the dynamics and management of organizational
knowledge and learning (Argyris, 1999; Nonaka, 1994;
Senge, 1990; Weick, 1993). For example, Nonaka and
his colleagues elaborate a knowledge-dynamics model
describing the processes by which different types of
knowledge are created, transformed, and transferred
in organizations (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi,
1995; Nonaka, Toyama, & Byosière, 2001). They contend that knowledge is fundamentally humanistic and
related to action. They make the critical distinction
between tacit and explicit knowledge (based on
Polyani’s seminal 1983 work on cognition). Tacit
knowledge (i.e., knowing how) is inherently embodied
in individual professionals (e.g., physicians, attorneys,
teachers), arises out of human experience, and defies
expression in formal and codified language. In contrast,
explicit knowledge (i.e., knowing about) can be
expressed in formal language and embedded in documents and protocols (i.e., formally specified routines),
and even programmed into machines.
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argue that individual tacit
knowledge may become organizational knowledge through
a dynamic, spiral-like process. Through “socialization”
routines, such as mentoring and coaching programs, context-specific and inarticulable tacit knowledge may be
transferred to others inside and outside the organization
through shared experiences, demonstrations, and informal
dialogue, to become their tacit knowledge, much in the way
that apprentices learn their craft through observation and
imitation. Over time, it usually becomes possible to articulate and convert some aspects of tacit knowledge into
formally communicated knowledge, which can then be
converted into increasingly more complex and systematic
sets of explicit knowledge through communication among
members of organizations or professional associations.
Importantly, individual professionals must ultimately convert explicit knowledge back into tacit knowledge by learning how to actually apply codified knowledge in practice. A
beneficial “spiral” emerges when the ongoing interaction
between tacit and explicit knowledge is dynamically
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elevated and shared vertically and horizontally, within
and between organizations.
The importance of fostering a culture conducive to
the creation and flow of knowledge, stressed by Nonaka
and Takeuchi (1995), has been reinforced by many
scholars in the field of organizational learning and
change (e.g., Argyris & Schön, 1996; Beer, 1992;
Popper & Lipshitz, 1998, 2000; Weick, 1995). In particular, the socialization process by which tacit knowledge is transferred benefits from an open organization
culture that balances individual competition and group
cooperation (Holste & Fields, 2010), promotes inquiry
and trust (McHugh, Groves, & Alker, 1998; O’Keeffe,
2002), and nurtures the development of shared understanding (Wang & Ahmed, 2003) and shared “mental
models” (Argyris, 1990; Senge, 1990). A number of
methods have been prescribed to encourage robust
knowledge exchange and deeper organization learning
through such processes as action learning (e.g.,
Bradbury & Reason, 2003; Senge, Roberts, Ross,
Smith, & Kliener, 1994; Yorks, Marsick, & O’Neil,
1999), and collaborative and appreciative inquiry (see,
e.g., Bray, Lee, Smith, & Yorks, 2000; Cooperrider &
Srivastva, 1987; Heron & Reason, 2008).
One KMT shortcoming is that little attention has been
paid to the process of actually applying knowledge
resources in production (Spender, 1994). A result is that
the field is somewhat unclear about the best organizational
structure for creating and transferring knowledge
(Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). Some authors assert that
formal hierarchical control can help to facilitate knowledge transfer because sharing through horizontal communication may not occur without structured direction and
support (Arrow, 1971; Kogut & Zander, 1992, 1996;
Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). However, most authors
warn that overly hierarchical structures impede creativity
and innovation because they constrain the creation and
transfer of tacit knowledge, which they see as best done via
flatter, more flexible, decentralized structures promoting
horizontal communication (Argyris, 1990; Conner, 1991;
Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Demsetz, 1988). Winter (1997)
asserts that only nonbureaucratic rules and directives are
compatible with knowledge integration requirements,
involving decentralized decision making and team-based
structures with fluid membership tapping into specialized
individual knowledge as needed. Grant (1996), echoing
contingency thinking, prescribes hybrid structures in
which the amount and form of hierarchical control vary
according to the degree of reciprocal interdependence
needed to integrate knowledge—with softer, more organic
controls for teams, and more bureaucratic controls where
knowledge workers contribute in more pooled or sequential fashions (similar to Thompson’s [1967] rationale for
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functional structure). In regard to incentive systems for
encouraging knowledge transfer and integration, Grant
(1996) and Foss and Foss (1998b) assert that social incentives that arise from developing a sense of shared context
(i.e., an open organization culture that values inquiry,
shared understanding and mental models, trust, appreciation, and reciprocity) will be more effective than instrumental incentives based on wages, bonuses, and
promotions earned by performance on objective
measures.
Another KMT shortcoming is that knowledge processes
are simply assumed to be better conducted through longer
term employment arrangements (Grant, 1996; Winter,
1987). This tends to neglect the potential of market
dynamics for creating and transferring knowledge
(Argyres & Zenger, 2012), and the potential transactional
(asset exchange) conflicts arising out of self-interested
opportunism by independent knowledge “agents”
(Spender, 1996), and thus does not compare the impacts
of different economic governance structures for managing
knowledge exchanges (e.g., arm’s-length transactions versus longer-term employment contracts), as discussed next
in the TCE section.
In summary, KMT contributes to the further development of organization capabilities particularly applicable to
cPHS firms by helping us more deeply understand the
importance of knowledge, and especially tacit knowledge,
as the most strategically important organization resource.
It posits that the key to superior performance capability
lies in developing distinctive meta-routines for managing
knowledge dynamics better than competitors. Such routines would create beneficial “spirals” of knowledge generation, accumulation, transfer, and integration to unleash
and leverage highly specialized knowledge for advantage.
Because of the criticality of tacit knowledge generation and
exchange, highly effective knowledge processes would
require fostering cultures that accelerate socialization and
the development of shared context and mental models.
However, although KMT elevates attention to knowledge
resources and the integration of tacit knowledge, and
informs the process for dynamically unleashing the potential of knowledge assets, standing alone it is vague on how
to appropriately procure knowledge assets and structurally
configure them to harness their potential.
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)
TCE essentially views firms as governance structures for
managing bundles of asset transactions (exchanges)
between providers and buyers (Coase, 1937; Williamson,
1975, 1985, 1996). Assets can be tangible (e.g., facilities,
equipment) or intangible (e.g., brands, human capital and
knowledge). TCE asserts that organization performance

can be greatly enhanced by finding the most comparatively
efficient ways of arranging its economic exchanges.
Accordingly, TCE grapples with determining when it is
better for a firm to secure and manage its asset exchanges
externally via arm’s-length market transactions versus
internally by bringing them inside the firm. The critical
role of management is seen to be as agents constantly
aligning the firm’s economic structure for asset control
(i.e., external versus internal) with the constantly changing
nature of its key exchange relationships in a way that
minimizes transaction costs.
For TCE, it is the attributes and costs of exchange
relationships that drive choices regarding firm governance
(economic) arrangements (for fuller treatment of transaction cost sources and types see, e.g., Rindfleisch and
Heide’s [1997] comprehensive review of TCE literature).
The two key transaction attributes most relevant to us
here are the specificity and uncertainty of asset exchanges.
“Asset specificity” refers to the highly customized and
nontransferable nature of assets that may be involved in
certain transactions (Williamson, 1975, 1985), rendering
them difficult to redeploy to other transactions and limiting their “salvage value” (or second-best use) should the
transaction be abandoned. This creates risks of “holdups”
should either of the exchange parties asymmetrically
incur substantial costs in renegotiating a prior transaction. Both environmental and behavioral uncertainties
also contribute to transaction costs. Reminiscent of contingency theory, “environmental uncertainty” refers to the
unpredictability, complexity, and/or changeability of the
circumstances surrounding an exchange (Klein, Frazier,
& Roth, 1990). “Behavioral uncertainty” arises from the
difficulty of monitoring and evaluating the contractual
performance of exchange partners, leading to potential
transaction conflicts; in fact, risks from possible opportunistic exploitation of assets by either party are a central
focus of TCE (Williamson, 1985).
These attributes create two types of transaction costs
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). “Opportunity costs” arise
from the failure to anticipate the need for and thus
invest in certain assets (adaptation failure), and the
failure to properly select appropriate providers and
the consequent productivity losses due to adjustment
problems. “Safeguarding costs” arise from the amount
of effort needed for ex ante screening and negotiating,
and post hoc monitoring and coordinating of contracts
to protect against risks of opportunism.
TCE prescribes arm’s-length market-based exchanges
as the default preferred economic structure for the firm
to manage its exchange relationships (Hayek, 1945). At
the extreme, this might include leasing all its equipment and information systems, and engaging all its
human capital as independent contractors through
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pay-for-performance arrangements (i.e., outsourcing,
contingent employment). TCE then considers circumstances where deviation from market-based transactions would economize transaction costs. Greater
internalization of assets is seen as increasingly more
efficient when transactions with providers are (or
become over time) highly frequent, uncertain, and specific (Barnard, 1938). That is because high transaction
uncertainty and specificity (customization requirements) create risks for the firm relying primarily on
market-based economic structure. Negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing the contractual safeguards
required in order to induce parties to make highly
customized asset investments (such as in buildings,
equipment, brand, and learning) become very costly,
particularly in the face of uncertainty and bounded
rationality (Simon, 1991), which limits the ability of
agents to foresee all future contingencies and contract
against them in an efficient way.
With its roots in the then industrial economy of the mid
1930s (e.g., Coase, 1937), TCE has been criticized for being
inattentive to economics of knowledge transactions, and
particularly neglectful in regard to tacit knowledge and
learning costs (Foss, 1996a, 1996b; Foss & Foss, 1998b;
Jiang, 2011). Knowledge assets have qualities that require
special treatment in conducting transaction cost analyses.
For instance, ex ante, it is especially difficult for the buyer to
inspect knowledge assets or develop tangible criteria for
their evaluation and pricing. Ex post, it is especially difficult
for the buyer to judge easily whether the purchase has been
fulfilled as contracted, and the seller of knowledge assets
often can still own and exploit its knowledge (Barney,
1999). For example, university professors still “own”, to
varying degrees, their course syllabi and publications.
Williamson (1981, p. 1562) acknowledged that “when
requisite information is distributed among a number of
individuals—all of whom understand their specialty in
only a tacit, intuitive way—a simple contract to transfer
the asset cannot be devised.” Further, “the corporation is
not just an instrument for organizing transactions; it is also
an instrument for learning” (Teece, 1990, p. 59). Therefore,
on top of the contractual “hazards” that TCE is accustomed
to handling, capitalizing on knowledge assets involves costs
relating to the learning process through which knowledge
assets get absorbed, assimilated, and internalized by the
buyer.
It is important to note here that some work in TCE and
evolutionary theories of economics (Dosi & Marengo,
1994, 2000; Foss, 1998; Nelson & Winter, 1982) has
attempted to integrate elements of KMT to partly remedy
some of TCE’s traditional gaps in regard to tacit knowledge and learning. For example, Jiang (2011) introduces
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the concepts of “knowledge specificity” and “learning costs”
to better account for the difficulty of transferring and
integrating the tacit knowledge embodied in individuals.
For her, knowledge specificity arises with “tacitness” and
the unique developmental paths that create it. Learning
costs refer to the more intangible costs (human and
intellectual capital, rather than financial capital) involved
in assimilating and integrating knowledge assets. She
asserts, therefore, that calculation of knowledge-management transaction costs must include not only opportunity
and safeguarding costs but also learning costs.
Other authors use ideas from the property rights
literature to provide economic interpretations of
knowledge management dynamics that explain the
transaction efficiencies that can arise from integration
of tacit knowledge and organizational learning routines
(Foss, 1998; Foss & Foss, 1998a, 1998b; Hart & Moore,
1990). They reinforce Grant’s (1996) assertion that
hierarchical rational control and instrumental incentives (e.g., pay, bonus) impede the development and
utilization of local knowledge, and that social incentives
to create a shared context (valuing common goals,
mutual understanding, appreciation, trust, reciprocity)
can help integrate and use local knowledge and produce
comparative advantage.
In summary, TCE posits that the key to superior
performance lies in maximizing the economic efficiency of an organization’s asset exchanges. It has generated considerable empirical support for, and is
prescriptively informative about, the causal relationship
between transaction attributes (such as asset specificity
and uncertainty), transaction risks and costs, and the
choice of best economic governance mechanisms.
Internalization of exchanges is viewed as a decidedly
more efficient economic structure for producing and
using knowledge assets than external, arm’s-length
market-based contracting. The infusion of evolutionary
theory begins to address some of TCE’s shortcomings
by introducing knowledge specificity and organizational learning costs to economic theories of organization. However, although TCE and evolutionary theory
together are quite informative about creating the
appropriate economic relationships with knowledgeasset providers, for the most part they ignore how to
functionally organize human knowledge assets to
unleash and harness their potential.

Synthesizing the theoretical domains
In this section we integrate the complementary strengths
of the three theoretical domains discussed in the preceding and focus on the key bridging themes and constructs
that emerge at their intersections. Figure 1 shows our

Figure 1. Integrated framework for managing knowledge assets as a path to building organization capability.
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integrated framework for managing knowledge assets as
a path to building organization capability.
Bridging TBCT and KMT: Learning systems and
functional design
The “stitching together” of TBCT’s contributions regarding the structural configuration of core tasks and KMT’s
contributions regarding the management of knowledge
and learning processes leads to an expanded view of
methods and tools for applying knowledge to solve coretask problems. As shown on the left of Figure 1, the themes
of knowledge and learning surface at the nexus of these two
theoretical domains as key contingency factors to consider, particularly for cPHS organizations. Accordingly,
the bridging construct of learning systems emerges as a
preeminent guiding objective in designing functional
structures. Prescriptively, in terms of design choices, building such learning systems would require “organic” teambased structures that facilitate collaborative interdependence, along with highly effective organizational metaroutines for managing knowledge dynamics, supported
by social incentives aimed at fostering a culture characterized by shared context and reciprocity. Thus, the fusion of
these two domains instructs us that strengthening the
performance capabilities of cPHS organizations requires
both processes (i.e., learning systems) for dynamically
unleashing the potential of knowledge assets, and structural arrangements (e.g., organization form, grouping
schemes, cultural context, incentive systems) to harness
and coordinate that potential.
However, the conjugation of the two theory streams
already described still remains largely blind to knowledge providers as potentially self-interested and political beings and the economic arrangements by which
they transact with the organization. Drawing on TCE’s
strengths partially addresses this shortcoming.
Bridging KMT and TCE: Learning costs and
economic structure
Combining TCE’s contributions regarding the comparative efficiency of asset exchanges with KMT’s
emphasis on knowledge management leads to elevating
knowledge assets as a central consideration in managing economic structure. As shown to the right of
Figure 1, two key themes surface at the nexus of KMT
and TCE (with evolutionary theory included): knowledge asset exchanges, and knowledge specificity. The
bridging construct of learning costs thus emerges as a
significant factor for determining the most comparatively efficient asset-exchange structure for cPHS firms
in which transactions with individuals embodying
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highly specific tacit knowledge predominate, along
with a strong need for knowledge exchanges among
members of cross-disciplinary teams. This fusion
instructs us that strengthening the performance capabilities of cPHS organizations requires constructing
the appropriate economic relationships with knowledge
asset providers (predominately internalized but also
arm’s length when advisable) that adequately take into
account the real costs of creating the knowledge assimilation and integration processes necessary to fully capitalize on the economic potential of those assets.
Synthesizing TBCT, KMT, and TCE
Figure 1 further depicts the fuller integration that
results from synthesis across all three theory domains.
As noted already, some recent work in TCE and evolutionary theories of economics reinforces the importance of contingency constructs emerging from the
integration of TBCT and KMT—learning systems,
meta-routines, and shared context as critical contingency factors driving operational design choices. In
addition to the traditional TCE prescription for internalizing such exchanges due to high asset specificity
and uncertainty, prescriptions for hybrid economic
structures manifest, with varied economic governance
structures recommended depending on the intra-organizational variation in team knowledge-exchange interdependency: a contingency-like core task operating
structure variable. Finally, the learning costs to implement appropriate learning systems for hybrid economic
arrangements become an important, if challenging,
design factor.
This three-way fusion suggests that stronger performance capability in cPHS organizations will result from
(a) the appropriate procurement and governance of
superior knowledge assets, along with (b) superior
learning processes to dynamically develop and unleash
the potential of those assets, and also (c) appropriate
structural arrangements to harness and coordinate
those assets. All three are thus essential components
of capability formation in cPHS organizations that
need to be managed synergistically.

Applying the synthesized framework
We continue to illustrate the synergistic components of our
integrated framework by applying them to two prominent
types of cPHS organizations in different sectors—higher
education and health care. Our purpose is to briefly demonstrate how the bridging constructs—learning systems and
learning costs –that emerge at the nexus of the three theoretical domains we drew upon can provide greater utility
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for decision making by managers of cPHS firms. An indepth examination of the great variation and complexity
within and across different types of higher education and
health care organizations is well beyond the scope of this
article. For simplicity, we confine our illustrative applications to one specific type of organization in each sector, as
specified in the following. For further simplicity, we concentrate on key issues facing these types of organizations
only in the United States, while fully recognizing that meaningful differences exist across international settings.
U.S. university-based business schools
Our focus here is on the business schools (or colleges)
offering undergraduate and graduate (master’s in business administration, MBA) business-education programs
as subunits within four-year, nonprofit (public or private) universities. We further focus on those whose
primary mission is teaching (versus research). From a
strategic contingency perspective, the instructionally
oriented “core task problem” for a successful teachingoriented business school can be looked at as how to most
effectively educate individuals about the nature of business and the practices needed for organizational and
personal success, in a way that provides the school
with some distinctiveness and comparative advantage
over rivals (Holtom & Dierdorff, 2015). Two of the key
issues facing administrators of U.S. business schools
concern curriculum innovation and cost containment.
Some context may help to better appreciate these issues.
The typical business school may be viewed as a quasiprofessionalized entity engaging in an increasingly
uncertain core task due to constant proliferation of
new content knowledge and an ever-changing mix of
students. This core task mainly requires tacit knowledge
embodied in individuals about how to effectively apply
new knowledge and emerging educational support technologies. These tacit knowledge assets may be fairly
common (e.g., basic, core-type courses) or highly specific
(e.g., specialized electives). Individual educators may be
engaged as (a) full-time tenure-track faculty with (typically) six years to earn enduring (essentially lifetime)
employment, (b) full-time lecturers and instructors on
one- to three-year contracts, or (c) part-time “adjunct
faculty” with short-term arm’s-length contracts to teach
one or two courses. All are expected to teach and keep
office hours to meet with their students, but only fulltime faculty are expected to also engage in substantial
scholarly and service (“citizenship”) activities, such as
publishing in academic journals, advising students
beyond their classes, serving on university committees,
and engaging in significant curriculum innovation
efforts. Business-school educators are usually organized

(grouped) along fragmented disciplinary lines (e.g., separate departments of economics and finance, marketing,
management and entrepreneurship, operations, and
decision sciences). Knowledge is mostly applied in
pooled and sequential fashions (i.e., teaching one course
or a sequence of courses) with relatively little knowledge
transfer and integration across departments. Although
most business schools have committees composed of
representatives from each department to oversee educational policy and curricula, such committees rarely
engage in intensive and sustained cross-disciplinary curriculum development initiatives (for reasons discussed in
the following).
The challenge of curriculum innovation centers
around how to create greater curriculum relevance,
coherence, and integration. There has been strong and
consistent criticism of the dominant “cookie-cutter”
design of business schools typically comprised of
“siloed” specialized knowledge assets that lack appropriate multidisciplinary integration (e.g., Holtom &
Dierdorff, 2015; Navarro, 2008; Porter & McKibbin,
1988; Watkins, 1996). Many authors have attributed
this lack of innovative curriculum design and integration to the absence of organization structures, routines,
and incentives that would motivate and enable faculty
members to continually dialogue and coordinate their
course contents, and to invest in labor-intensive
approaches to instruction or developing new pedagogical skills (e.g., Arum & Roska, 2011; Malekzadeh, 1998).
In addressing the need for greater curriculum innovation and integration, our framework (Figure 1) would
direct school administrators to focus on developing task
assignment and learning systems (at the TBCT–KMT
interface) to better unleash and harness their knowledge
assets by dissolving silos of specialized functional disciplines and integrating disparate sets of tacit “know-how.”
This might involve the following types of actions:
Developing complex overarching “meta-routines”
for integrating faculty knowledge sets, including
workshops, cross-mentoring programs, and crossdisciplinary team teaching.
● Assigning a much greater proportion of a school’s
faculty to multidisciplinary teams for cross-cutting
curricula design innovation and collaborative
delivery.
● Aligning processes, incentives, and culture to foster greater dialogue and coordination.
● Using performance-related incentives such as special bonuses contingent on team accomplishments
to get faculty members to engage diligently in
multidisciplinary team efforts.
●
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●

Using social incentives to strengthen shared context (culture), such as special recognition for
cross-disciplinary collaboration and participation
in college community events.
● Anticipating and funding the significant “learning
costs” associated with all of the preceding.
The challenge of cost containment arises from such
external contingencies as supply-side proliferation (e.g.,
spread of for-profit schools; Gaddis, 2000), demandside stagnation (i.e., declining enrollments; Brown,
2012; Clinton, 2016; McLeod, 2013), and growing student debt, compelling attention to reducing the time
and costs to complete a degree and graduate. The need
to economize asset exchanges has led to a gradual shift
toward a more “arm’s-length” and less costly economic
governance structure, with increasingly greater numbers of “contingent” faculty (adjunct and part-time
instructors) compared to full-time faculty (Arum &
Roska, 2011; Nelson, 2016; Kezar & Maxey, 2013).
Deriving precise statistics is difficult, due to varying
definitions of full-time versus part-time faculty and
different schemes for categorizing educational units.
Looking at higher education in general, Kezar and
Maxey (2013) noted that tenured and tenure-track
positions had declined from approximately 78.3% of
faculty in 1969 to 33.5% of the professoriate in 2009,
with 47.7% now part-time faculty. Although the growth
of part-time faculty is greatest at community colleges,
they now make up a large portion of the faculty at both
public and private nonprofit four-year comprehensive
universities—about 45% and 53%, respectively. The
trend in business schools may be less extreme, at least
in accredited schools that are required to maintain a
higher level of professionalization. The primary accrediting body for business schools, the American
Association of Collegiate Schools of Business
(AACSB), reports that the proportion of part-time
faculty members in member schools only increased
from 15.5% in 2011 to 17.2% in 2015 (Nelson, 2016).
Given that the preponderance of business schools are
not accredited, we can speculate that the percentages in
nonaccredited schools would be somewhere between
that cited by AACSB and that for higher education
more generally. The considerable cost savings that can
accrue from greater reliance on part-time faculty
reflects significant differences in average salaries—
$78,625 (not counting benefits) for full-time faculty
on nine-month contracts across all ranks and disciplines in four-year universities, to teach between four
to eight courses per year (National Center for
Education Statistics, 2014), whereas part-time adjuncts
usually receive in the range of only $3,000 to 6,000 per
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course (little changed over a decade). Garth-James
(2016) notes that effective implementation of the parttime adjunct model can be challenging, and its effects
on instructional quality and student success rates have
not yet been established.
In thinking through the wisdom of this shift in
economic relationship structure, our framework
would direct administrators to focus on the implications for their unit’s knowledge dynamics and learning costs (at the KMT–TCE interface). This might
involve the following types of actions:
●

●

●

●

●
●

●

●

Creating the “hybrid” economic structure and
functional structure that can simultaneously govern effectively both full- and part-time knowledge
workers—very different types of cadres.
Continuing tight management control over
arm’s-length knowledge workers (e.g., part-time
adjuncts, instructors) using a pooled, hierarchical, formalized, “mechanistic” approach with
instrumental incentives for quality program
delivery.
Simultaneously using a highly “organic,” reciprocally-interdependent, team-based learning
system for full-time faculty, with strong social
incentives for collaborative innovation and “citizenship” contributions.
Implementing strategies to minimize negative
impact of a greater amount of arm’s-length market-based exchanges on the socialization routines
needed for critical tacit-knowledge exchange and
the greater degree of integration being called for
by these types of units.
Considering strengthening mentoring programs
for on-boarding adjunct faculty.
Exploring opportunities (and costs) to more fully
engage part-time faculty in department meetings,
curriculum development efforts, and school ceremonies and events, while increasing compensation
to reflect their greater involvement.
Implementing strategies to protect against the
exchange risk of arm’s-length contractors appropriating the school’s knowledge assets (e.g., programs and syllabi).
Carefully evaluating the impacts on student success and on whether sufficient comparative
advantage is accruing to the school from
increased arm’s-length economic arrangements.

U.S. general acute care hospitals
For purposes of this article, we define an acute care
hospital as a nonsectarian, privately owned health care

28

J. HARMON ET AL.

facility licensed to provide medical treatment for emergent and urgent conditions on a short-term basis for a
variety of health-related needs arising from the community it serves. While many such facilities have diversified along the continuum of outpatient and wellness
services, we restrict our focus to inpatient care. Our
focus is further limited to a single hospital entity (in
contradistinction to a multihospital system) and to
nonteaching institutions.
Although there is considerable variation in the structuring of hospital medical staffs, acute care hospitals are typically organized into a complex array of discrete and largely
autonomous departmental units based on distinct professional disciplines (e.g., medical specialties, surgical specialties, obstetrics/gynecology, anesthesiology, radiology,
pathology, emergency medicine). The existence (and persistence) of clinical silos is often necessitated by strict credentialing procedures and external accreditation
guidelines. While laboring to comply with discipline-specific quality standards, acute care hospitals are concurrently
challenged to create innovative programs that coordinate
individual episodes of care across the delivery continuum
and to assemble the resources required to manage the
health outcomes for defined subpopulations of patients.
Successful implementation of such innovative programs
demands a fresh approach to managing agents of professional knowledge.
The core service task of acute care hospitals can be
viewed as offering accessible and cost-effective health care
to the communities they serve. In the context of professional health services, the degree of professionalization of
knowledge workers (primarily physicians) and the amount
of task (treatment) interdependence are meaningfully
greater than in the educational context. Nevertheless, we
suggest that placing heightened attention on our bridge
constructs may yield superior performance outcomes for
such organizations.
Practicing hospital managers are well aware that U.S.
acute care hospitals are presently confronting several
major challenges as they grapple with the demands of
(and uncertainty surrounding) national health reform
initiatives, shifts from retrospective to prospective
reimbursement methods, and the trend toward transferring risk from insurers to providers. Chief among
these challenges are pressures to create integrated delivery systems and growing demands from external stakeholders to provide greater “value” for the dollar. To
successfully respond to these changing demands, hospital managers will need to forge stronger ties (economically and organizationally) with physicians (who
typically are “contractors” versus employees in the
United States), and cultivate innovative programs that
demonstrate measurable value for health insurance

plans, employers, and patients. Recently reported data
suggest that the number and growth rate of hospital–
physician employment relationships are increasing; the
percentage of hospitals employing physicians rose from
29% to 42% over the decade spanning 2003 through
2012 (Scott, Orav, Cutler, & Jha, 2017). While the
presumption is that hospital–physician integration
engenders greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness
through reduction of transaction costs, emerging evidence indicates that such integration can be associated
with higher prices and spending (Baker, Bundorf, &
Kessler, 2014). This paradoxical observation may be
attributable in part to inattention to the bridging constructs underscored in this article.
Application of our framework engenders several
core questions: How might hospital executives best
unleash and harness the tacit knowledge assets embodied in their service professionals? How might functional and economic arrangements need to be
modified to align the behavior of knowledge providers with growing demands for improved quality of
care at lower prices? How might hospitals use monetary and social incentives to engender intrapreneurial
behavior, particularly among formerly independent
physicians who have sold their practices to become
salaried employees of the hospital? How might hospitals offset associated learning costs in the face of
shrinking reimbursements? Responses to these questions that reflect a TBCT-KMT-TCE synthesis might
evoke managerial actions, such as:
Designing “hybrid” economic structures to govern
the required mix of knowledge-asset providers (at
the TCE–KMT interface):
○ Maintaining or instituting arm’s-length
arrangements with physicians that provide
highly specialized services that are best acquired
on the “spot market.”
○ Establishing employment arrangements and
long-term contracts to govern the exchange of
healthcare services provided by physicians whose
knowledge is central to the core mission of various hospital programs and centers of excellence.
○ Implementing overarching economic and legal
structures to ensure that all knowledge providers are organized into an integrated delivery
system that is capable of coordinating and
monitoring the quality and cost of services rendered across the continuum of care.
● Designing “hybrid” functional structures to control and coordinate the activities of different
groups of part-time and full-time knowledge
assets (TBCT–KMT interface):
●
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○ Organize part-time medical staff, those with
courtesy or affiliate appointments who only
occasionally admit patients or have strictly consulting privileges, using a hierarchical functional structure with coordination and control
mechanisms that are more formal than are currently deployed by most U.S. hospitals.
○ Encourage independent physicians with active
medical staff appointments to participate in
care delivery initiatives that call for greater
interdisciplinary orchestration of services. To
induce such engagement, hospital leaders
might add an assessment of “teamwork” to the
standard litany of re-appointment criteria. This
can be combined with instrumental incentives
(e.g., pay-for performance, shared savings programs) to align the behavior of independent
practitioners with the hospital’s imperative to
deliver greater “value” for purchasers of care.
○ Organize full-time physicians, who are governed by employment or long-term contract
agreements with the hospital, into multidisciplinary teams that create unique meta-routines
(knowledge sets combined into innovative care
pathways) conducive to development of new
treatment programs capable of yielding
enhanced value to stakeholders. Link financial
incentives (e.g., salary increases, bonuses tied to
productivity) to such activities to more tightly
couple clinical and economic performance.
○ Supplement financial incentives with social incentives that reward team performance and encourage subunit cultures rooted in performance
excellence and shared context. Recognition for
exemplary citizenship behaviors, certificates of
achievement, citations of appreciation from
senior management, team festivities, celebrations
of success, and corporate donations to a charity of
choice are some examples of culture-building
incentives to help transform rugged individualists
into team players. Naturally, the specific nature of
such incentives will need to be tailored to the
strategic goals and cultural transformations
being pursued by management.
○ Envisage and support learning costs incurred to
implement actions just listed with appropriate
investments in technological and intellectual
capital.

Discussion
This article seeks to aid managers and scholars concerned with the issue of how to manage knowledge
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assets as a source of competitive advantage in complex
professional human service (cPHS) organizations; a
growing segment of modern economies. To do so, it
attempts to address the call for integration of independent theoretical streams (Mahoney & McGahan, 2007),
using a typology approach to theory building that
reviewed existing literature and extracted interrelated
theoretical dimensions and causal interactions (as suggested by Cornelissen, 2017). It further follows the lead
of Kessler and Bartunek (2014) by “stitching together”
existing bodies of theory to create an enhanced understanding (and greater systemic capacity to manage)
their interrelated dynamics.
Our framework draws upon what we view as three
particularly relevant theoretical domains—contingency
thinking, knowledge management, and transaction economics. We show how the complementary strengths of
these three theoretical streams offers the potential for
integration and synthesis through the generation of
important “bridging” constructs at their interface: surfacing “cross-domain” factors especially worthy of consideration by mangers seeking superior performance in
cPHS organizations. Our framework focuses at the level
of core task activities for subunits of cPHS organizations, and the knowledge dynamics and asset exchange
factors associated with those tasks. It purposefully
focuses on organizational subunits as the level of analysis (consistent with TBCT) due to our interest in the
behavior of complex organizations that, by their very
nature, comprise constellations of mission-centric tasks
that may vary considerably with respect to the variables
being studied, with each searching for the best fit
between their core task and structure.
We maintain that managers guided by our framework bridging the domains of TBCT, KMT, and TCE
are more likely to focus attention on core issues facing
cPHS firms. More specifically, we argue that effective
management of such firms requires greater attention to
(a) knowledge and learning as core contingency factors;
(b) learning systems, meta-routines, and shared context
as core features of operating structure; and (c) knowledge asset exchanges and learning costs as core elements of economic governance structure. To derive
superior capabilities from their knowledge assets, we
assert that cPHS managers must create organization
systems that (a) appropriately procure knowledge assets
(with learning costs factored into assessment of economic efficiency), (b) create processes (learning systems) to dynamically unleash their potential, and (c)
create structural arrangements to harness and coordinate this potential. We further assert that all three
elements are essential and synergistic; when any of
these interdependent pieces is missing or poorly
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managed, organizational capability and performance
will suffer.
To illustrate the utility of learning systems and learning
costs as emergent bridge constructs, we briefly applied
these constructs to two specific types of cPHS organizations—U.S. university-based non-profit (public or private) business schools with teaching missions, and U.S.
in-patient, acute care hospitals. The authors, based on
their experience with both entities, have observed that
some presently are partially implementing aspects and
elements of the separate domains in our framework,
either by design or by default. For example, both are
extensively implementing information technologies to
increase their information-processing capabilities (consistent with traditional contingency thinking). Both are also
seeking to increase knowledge integration and coordination of services through greater team-based collaboration
(partially fusing KMT and TBCT). Additionally, both
appear to be following lessons from TCE, albeit in contrary ways: Business schools are moving toward greater
numbers of arm’s-length contracts with part-time faculty
to economize transaction costs, while hospitals are
increasing the number of employment arrangements with
physicians (“internalization”) to gain greater control over
utilization and coordination of knowledge resources.
However, most of these actions seem to be instinctive or
reactive, rather than intellectually guided and proactive.
Very few initiatives seem to be unleashing the full potential of our framework by leveraging the bridge constructs
it brings to our attention. For example, most of these
organizations are not, in our experience, trying to properly adapt their behavioral management structures or to
create the learning systems and shared context needed for
the effectiveness of their increasingly hybrid economic
structures: issues that have received precious little direct
attention in prior literature. That might partly explain, for
example, why business school curricula remain overly
traditional and poorly integrated, and greater employment of physician by hospitals may not be leading to
expected efficiencies, as noted by Scott et al. (2017).
Given that our primary purpose was to develop a
novel framework integrating three particular theoretical
streams, we confined our brief applications to one
particular type of entity in the higher education and
health care sectors, and to broad implementation
guidelines briefly illustrating the framework’s potential.
We readily acknowledge that many important variations and complexities within these and other cPHS
arenas exist that warrant deeper attention and
specificity.
Future research should endeavor to investigate the
relationship we have outlined between the variation
across cPHS organizations in their degree of focus on

our bridge constructs, the ways they are implemented,
and their connection to subunit capabilities and performance. For instance, empirical researchers could seek
to develop reliable measures of learning-system quality
and learning-cost investment, and examine their linkages to established measures of capabilities and performance in various contexts. In addition, theoreticians
could seek to identify other potentially important bridging themes and constructs drawn from additional
theory domains. Also, the relevance of our bridge constructs could be examined in other types of cPHS firms
than the two discussed here, and in varied international
contexts.
When extending the application of our proposed
framework to other professional service settings,
variances likely exist in the relative importance of
our bridging constructs and the consideration of
others. How might the application of our framework be different for law or financial services
firms or for different types of organizations within
any particular cPHS sector? For instance, even business schools vary greatly in mission (teaching,
research), programs, faculty size and composition,
and size of student populations. Similarly, hospitals
vary greatly in type (general acute care, specialized,
teaching, sectarian), geography (urban, suburban,
rural), and affiliation (freestanding or part of a
multi-hospital system). Location factors may be particularly important. European employment law regulates the mix and duration of employment
contracts, exerting greater constraining influences
on choice of economic governance structure for
organizations operating there. Further, employment
of physicians may be regulated and constrained by
state-specific “corporate practice of medicine” laws
in the United States. Simply stated, such laws (in
states where they apply) essentially restrict to varying degrees the practice of medicine to licensed
physicians, based on the rationale that clinical decision making and accountability must be exclusively
vested in the health care practitioner, and thus prohibiting corporate entities from directly employing
medical doctors (Schaff & Prives, 2010).
In conclusion, we view the greatest potential contribution of our resulting multitheoretical framework to
principally reside in elevating the bridging themes and
constructs we have identified from the periphery of
design thinking to core considerations for cPHS firm
practitioners making design decisions, and for
researchers seeking to empirically confirm the relative
effectiveness of various cPHS organization design configurations. We posit that elevating learning systems
and learning costs (our bridge constructs) to a more
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central position in decision making has the potential to
improve the management of knowledge assets, thereby
producing superior and more sustainable cPHS firm
capabilities and performance. This may lead cPHS
organizations to more appropriately procure and govern their knowledge assets, while simultaneously
unleashing and harnessing their potential—all of
which need to be managed collectively and synergistically. With professional human services organizations
constituting an increasingly large and important segment of our economy, improving their effectiveness
should have a meaningful impact on our society.
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